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Part 4: The Payments System 
and the Market for 
Interbank Funds 
he two papers in a session on systemic issues in the federal 
funds market examined the interbank payments system 
and the market for borrowing funds used to settle interbank 
payments. Both analyses were based on data on payments made 
through the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire system. 
Fedwire—the nation’s primary interbank payments 
system—is a real-time gross settlement system through which 
payments are settled individually and with finality. More than 
9,500 participants use Fedwire to send and receive time-critical 
and/or large-value payments on behalf of corporate, financial, 
and individual clients as well as to settle positions with other 
participants stemming from payments in other systems, securities 
settlement, and interbank loans. In the first half of 2006, an 
average of 525,000 Fedwire payments were made each day, with 
the daily value of funds transferred averaging $2.1 trillion. 
Complementing the Fedwire payments system is the U.S. 
federal funds market, where banks borrow funds to settle the 
payments they make over Fedwire. Fed funds are the bank 
reserves on deposit at the Federal Reserve used to settle 
payments between banks. The fed funds market plays a critical 
role in allocating liquidity in the financial system as well as in 
supporting banks’ ability to finalize the settlement of interbank 
payment obligations.
The first paper, by Adam Ashcraft of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and Darrell Duffie of Stanford University, 
explored whether trading frictions in the fed funds market 
affect the reallocation of excess reserves to banks requiring 
funds to complete their payments. Ashcraft and Duffie found 
that fed funds trading is driven partially by individual banks’ 
precautionary targeting of balances, and that this targeting 
contributes to systemic stability. The banks’ trading of funds 
mitigates the risk of overconcentration of reserves in some 
banks, and contributes to the liquidity of the fed funds market 
and keeps price volatility relatively low. The second paper, 
by Morten Bech of the New York Fed, Walter Beyeler and 
Robert Glass of Sandia National Laboratories, and Kimmo 
Soramäki of the European Central Bank (who did not 
present), analyzed the network structure of interbank 
payments and developed a model for a payments system 
within such a network. The paper concluded that a liquidity 
market allows a payments system to achieve a specified level 
of performance with much less liquidity than would 
otherwise be required—a finding that sheds light on the 
trade-offs between liquidity within the payments system 
and friction within the liquidity market. The combination 
of network topology and bank behavior within a model, 
the study also found, is critical for analysis of systemic risk 
in payments systems. According to the authors, it is not 
sufficient just to understand the topology of the network; 
knowledge of the processes operating in that topology, 
such as bank behavior, is equally important.
Systemic Dynamics in the Federal 
Funds Market
Ashcraft and Duffie analyzed how allocational frictions affect 
trading in the federal funds market. They also considered 
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whether these frictions could lead to systemic risk in the form 
of  “gridlock,” in which individual financial institutions fail to 
transfer balances quickly to counterparties as they wait for the 
counterparties to transfer balances to them. Gridlock creates a 
self-fulfilling slowdown in the efficient reallocation of excess 
balances. 
Like every over-the-counter market, the fed funds market 
is subject to allocational frictions because trading is executed 
through bilateral negotiation.1 These frictions can be any 
sources of transaction costs or delays in identifying suitable 
counterparties, negotiating trades, or executing trades, and 
they can impact market efficiency. Existing theories of trading 
dynamics in over-the-counter markets have focused on 
“search” frictions, whereby traders locate each other with 
delays, to some extent by trial and error, and negotiate prices 
that depend in part on the difficulty of finding suitable 
alternative counterparties. Prices also reflect the relative 
benefits of making a trade immediately rather than later 
(and with a newly found counterparty) for each of the two 
counterparties. As frictions increase and the matching of 
suitable pairs of counterparties becomes more difficult, a trader 
with an urgent need to transact has relatively less “leverage” 
during a bilateral negotiation, and this condition is reflected in 
the contracted price. The efficiency of allocation and the effect 
of search frictions on pricing are among the main concerns of 
the various theoretical studies. Yet there is little empirical work 
on these aspects of the microstructure of over-the-counter 
markets.
Ashcraft and Duffie broaden this relatively small body of 
empirical research as well as add a unique dimension to it. 
Their analysis of allocational frictions uses transaction-level 
data from Fedwire, and the majority of their work focuses on 
the top 100 institutions by payment, or “send,” volume for 
business days in 2005.2 This data set permits the construction 
of real-time balances for each institution and allows for the 
tracking of the sender and receiver of payments and loans for 
1In the fed funds market, brokers reduce but do not eliminate the allocational 
frictions.
2The researchers protected the confidentiality of the institutions by removing 
firm-specific details and conducting all data-related work within the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. 
every minute of the day. The authors identified a particular 
send as a loan, as opposed to another form of payment, by 
analyzing the terms of payments in the reverse direction 
between the same two counterparties on the next business 
day. (Fed funds loans are for overnight repayment.)
Ashcraft and Duffie documented evidence of federal funds 
trading being driven partially by individual banks’ precaution-
ary targeting of balances. Banks are motivated to end each day 
with non-negative balances in their reserve accounts at the 
Federal Reserve because overnight overdrafts are not permitted 
except in special circumstances.3 These institutions are also 
motivated to end each day with relatively small balances, in 
part because the Federal Reserve does not pay interest on 
overnight balances and in part because the institutions have 
other ways to meet their reserve requirements over their two-
week maintenance periods, such as by holding currency in large 
ATM networks and by sweeping funds in reservable accounts 
into nonreservable accounts. 
By targeting its balances, a bank contributes to systemic 
stability. When its balances are larger than they typically are 
at a particular time of the day, a bank has an incentive to trade, 
and especially to lend, so as to reduce the balances. Ashcraft 
and Duffie showed that, empirically, banks indeed act consis-
tently in response to this incentive. Likewise, when balances 
are low, banks trade (in particular, borrow) on average so 
as to raise them. This self-interested balance targeting at the 
individual bank level promotes systemic stability.4 It mitigates 
the risk of overconcentration of reserves in some banks and 
underallocation in others. Balance targeting reduces the risk of 
gridlock, and plays a role in keeping the federal funds market 
liquid and funds rate volatility relatively low. 
Drawing on their discussions with fed funds traders, 
Ashcraft and Duffie reported that fed funds trading is 
significantly more sensitive to reserve balances in the last hour 
of the day. For example, at some large banks, fed funds traders 
responsible for targeting a small, non-negative end-of-day 
balance ask other profit centers of their institutions to avoid 
large, unscheduled payments, such as settlement of currency 
trades, near the end of the day. Once a fed funds trader has a 
reasonable estimate of the extent of current and yet-to-be-
executed send and receive transactions, he can adjust pricing 
and trading negotiations with other banks so as to push his 
bank’s balances in the desired direction. Ashcraft and Duffie 
uncovered empirical evidence of this behavior; furthermore, 
3The Federal Reserve’s discount window is available, but at terms that make it 
preferable to achieve non-negative balances through fed funds trading with 
other banks before the end of the day.
4One may think in terms of the usual “eigenvalue” or “mean-reversion” 
conditions for dynamic stability of a multivariate dynamic system. In this case, 
the coordinate processes of the system are the current balances of each bank 
in the system.
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they found that such behavior is more pronounced following 
increases in intraday rate volatility. 
In addition, the authors raised the issue of, but did not 
resolve, whether precautionary balance targeting by banks in 
the fed funds market, coupled with a regime in which banks 
forecast the targeting policies of other banks, could have 
systemically destabilizing consequences. A potential systemic 
problem could arise, for example, if several large institutions 
during a day of extreme misallocation of reserves individually 
“hoarded” reserves, given the heightened risk of other banks 
doing the same or the institutions’ forecasts that other banks 
are incapable of releasing excess reserves quickly to the market. 
For instance, Ashcraft and Duffie reported traders’ accounts 
of rumors that this type of behavior was initially feared on 
September 11, 2001, with the communications disruptions that 
day affecting the Bank of New York, a large clearing bank.5 
Any such gridlock was in the end averted by energetic liquidity 
provision by the Federal Reserve.
Without significant liquidity provision by a central bank 
during such an event, “a run on reserves” could stress the 
ability of the fixed intraday supply of reserves to be sufficiently 
reallocated quickly to meet requirements. (The total amount 
of reserves in the system is relatively small compared with 
the total daily volume of transactions.) Even in an extreme 
scenario, however, access to the discount window as well as 
infusions of liquidity by the Federal Reserve and other central 
banks would mitigate adverse systemic effects, as they did on 
September 11.6 
Network-Based Modeling 
of Systemic Risk in the Interbank 
Payments System
The cross-disciplinary team of Bech, Beyeler, and Glass began 
by discussing two new approaches for characterizing the 
nonlocal, systemwide interconnections that may lead to 
systemic risk, and then combined the approaches to analyze the 
Fedwire interbank payments system. Their research first 
examined the global structure of interconnections in Fedwire 
by representing bilateral interbank relationships as a network. 
This approach allows one to quantify the overall pattern of 
interaction and interdependencies using well-defined 
measures applied to other complex networks, as well 
5McAndrews and Potter (2002) describe how the disruption of the regular 
timing of incoming payments made a bank’s liquidity management more 
difficult, and for some banks the “increased uncertainty (regarding which 
payments they might receive later in the day) led them to have higher 
precautionary demand for liquid balances.”  
6For example, see McAndrews and Potter (2002) and Lacker (2004).
as to observe how those measures change during disruptions. 
Bech et al. next presented a model with simple agents 
interacting within a payments system network; the model 
exhibited a transition from independent to highly inter-
dependent behavior as liquidity was reduced. When the 
authors applied the model to a liquidity market, they 
demonstrated that a reduction in market frictions can reduce 
this interdependence and thus the likelihood and size of 
congestive liquidity cascades.
Network Topology of Interbank 
Payment Flows
A payments system can be viewed as a specific type of complex 
network.7 In recent years, many fields of science have sought 
to characterize the structure of networked systems and the 
relationship between network topologies and stability, 
resiliency, and efficiency. From a communications or 
information-technology perspective, Fedwire is a “star” 
network, in which all participants are linked to a central hub: 
the Federal Reserve. Because of its ability to wire funds, 
Fedwire is a complete network, as all nodes (participants) can 
communicate (send and receive payments) with all others. 
However, the actual behavior of participants, the flow of 
liquidity in the system, and thereby the contagion channel for 
financial disturbances are not captured by these network 
representations. 
The graph of actual payment flows over the Fedwire system 
includes more than 6,600 nodes and more than 70,000 links, 
but a subgraph, or core, of just 66 nodes and 181 links accounts 
for 75 percent of the value transferred. A prominent feature 
of Fedwire is that 25 nodes form a densely connected subgraph 
to which all the remaining nodes connect. By itself, this core 
is almost a complete graph, and this small number of banks 
and the links between them process the large majority of all 
payments sent over the network. Soramäki et al. (2006) show 
that the network shares many characteristics with other 
empirical complex networks. These characteristics include 
7See, for example, Newman (2003).
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a scale-free degree distribution, a high clustering coefficient, 
and the “small-world” phenomenon. Apart from the core, 
the network, like many other technological networks, is 
disassortative. That is, large banks tend to connect to small 
banks and vice versa. 
Bech et al. showed that the topology of the network was 
altered significantly by the attack on the World Trade Center 
on September 11, 2001. First, the massive damage to property 
and communications systems in Lower Manhattan made it 
more difficult—and in some cases impossible—for certain 
banks to execute payments to one another, as some nodes were 
removed from the system or had their capacity reduced. 
Second, the failure of some banks to make payments disrupted 
the coordination upon which banks rely when they use 
incoming payments to fund their own transfers to other banks. 
A Payments System Model
In a paper by Bech et al. (2006), the authors use an elementary, 
agent-based model in the spirit of models applied to under-
standing self-organized criticality.8 Physicists have used these 
models to study cascading phenomena in a variety of systems 
(for instance, Jensen [1998]), where models made of very 
simple agents, interacting with neighboring agents, can 
yield surprising insights about system-level behavior. In the 
Bech et al. model, interbank payments occur only along the 
links of a scale-free network based on the authors’ analysis 
of Fedwire data; the model thus shows that only a very small 
fraction of the possible interbank exchanges tend to be active. 
Bank customers randomly instruct the institutions to make 
payments, and banks are reflexively cooperative: they submit 
payments if the balance in their payments system account 
allows them to; otherwise, they queue the instruction for 
settlement later.
If a bank receiving a payment has instructions in its queue, 
the payment enables it to submit a payment in turn. If the bank 
that receives the payment is also queuing instructions, it can 
make a payment, and so on. In this way, a single initial payment 
can cause many payments to be released from the queues of the 
downstream receiving banks. This is an example of the cascade 
processes typically studied in other models of self-organized 
criticality. 
In the Bech et al. model, a single parameter—overall 
liquidity—controls the degree of interdependence of inter-
bank payments. Abundant liquidity allows banks to operate 
independently; reduced liquidity increases the likelihood that 
a bank will exhaust its balance and begin queuing payments. 
8For example, see Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld (1987).
When liquidity is low, a bank’s ability to process payments 
becomes coupled with the ability of other banks to process and 
send payments. In this instance, the output of the payments 
system as a whole is no longer determined by the overall 
input of payment instructions but instead is dominated by 
the internal dynamics of the system, and the correlation 
between arriving instructions and submitted payments 
degrades as liquidity is reduced. The model does not exhibit 
a phase transition between completely noncongested and 
completely congested states. The distribution of congestive 
events, or liquidity cascades, is close to a geometric distri-
bution, and it has an inherent length scale independent of 
network size. This result differs from the finding obtained 
in systems that exhibit self-organized criticality (such as in 
Jensen [1998]); the result is directly attributable to differ-
ences in the underlying relaxation process that set the 
simple payments system apart from systems that display 
self-organized criticality. 
The Market for Interbank Payment Funds
Going beyond the study of the payments system in isolation, 
Bech et al. combined it with a simple model of a liquidity 
market. Liquidity market transactions were represented as 
a diffusive process, where liquidity flows are not confined to 
the links of the payments network. In the model, each bank is 
directly connected to a central node representing the market, 
and this connection is characterized by a conductance 
parameter that reflects the cost or friction associated with 
market transactions. The market creates a separate network 
of liquidity flows that, having a star topology, operates parallel 
to the network of payment flows. 
The inclusion of a liquidity market weakened the coupling 
between banks and reduced the size of settlement cascades. 
Bech et al. identified trade-off functions that relate different 
levels of system performance, in terms of cascade size and 
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queue size, to the value of initial system funding and market 
conductance needed to achieve that performance. The liquidity 
market is very effective in reducing cascade size and queue size. 
For a given level of performance, the rate of liquidity flow 
through the market relative to the rate of flow through the 
payments system was surprisingly small. The performance of 
the system can be greatly improved by the market even though 
less than 2 percent of system through-put flows in the market. 
A liquidity market allows a system to achieve a specified level 
of performance with much less total liquidity than a system 
without a market would require. Conversely, the performance 
of such a system is highly dependent on the operation of the 
market. Disruptions to the market would greatly increase 
congestion and cascades unless they were mitigated, for 
example, through the addition of liquidity.
According to the authors, if the combined payments and 
liquidity market system is modeled with simple processes, the 
boundary between noncongested and congested states can be 
explained in terms of the relative values of three time constants: 
a liquidity depletion time, which is governed by the initial 
liquidity in the system; a net position return time, which 
increases with total deposits in the system; and a liquidity 
redistribution time through the market, which is associated 
with the market conductance parameter. An understanding of 
this boundary has significant practical applications because this 
understanding allows for direct consideration of the trade-offs 
between liquidity within the payments system and friction 
within the liquidity market, both of which are modified by 
central bank policies. While the Bech et al. model does not yet 
include the behavioral feedbacks that likely factor into the 
decision making of banks, those feedbacks can be included in 
order to consider how the congestion boundary may move. 
A goal of future studies will be to introduce into models this 
complexity as well as variability in the size of bank payments. 
Wide-scale disruptions may not only present operational 
challenges for participants in a payments system, but they may 
also induce participants to change the way they conduct 
business, with the potential to either mitigate or exacerbate 
adverse effects (Bech and Garratt 2006). An understanding 
of how participants interact and react when faced with 
operational adversity will assist payments system operators and 
regulators in designing countermeasures, devising policies, 
and providing emergency assistance, if necessary. Accordingly, 
as Bech et al. argue, it is not sufficient just to understand the 
topology of the network; knowledge of the processes operating 
in that topology is as important. 
Discussion
Robustness Issues
Much of the discussion following the presentations centered 
on questions concerning the robustness of the fed funds market 
and the interbank payments system. In particular, how much 
shock can the system tolerate—and would a shock move 
the system to a new, less desirable equilibrium? Moreover, if 
there are multiple equilibria, which are stable and which are 
unstable? Although the models presented in this session 
suggested the resiliency of the payments system when 
combined with a liquidity market for interbank payment 
funds, the models were not complete enough to assess these 
issues definitively. 
The models do not have multiple equilibria because they do 
not yet include the anticipatory behavior that could produce 
feedback effects leading to system gridlock. In the combined 
payments system and liquidity market model, congestive 
liquidity cascades within the payments system are mitigated 
through transfers within the fed funds market. Each bank is 
trying to mean-revert toward a target level of reserves, and the 
more quickly they adjust toward the target, or the lower the 
friction, the faster the system moves to a stable and stationary 
equilibrium. If expectations and anticipatory behavior are 
introduced, such behavior could produce a model with 
explosive or unstable equilibria—the “gridlock scenario” that 
so alarms payments system operators. While the model has not 
been extended in that direction, it is conceptually feasible to 
model the self-sustaining volatility that would prevent banks 
from reaching a stable equilibrium. Doing so empirically, 
however, would pose a challenge because the rarity of systemic 
crises severely limits the historical data on the behavior being 
modeled.
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Another challenge in modeling empirically the fed funds 
market and the payments system is to account for the central 
bank’s deep involvement in the system as well as its ability to 
take corrective action to stabilize the system.9 Because of this 
stabilizing role, no data exist on the extreme states of the system 
where instability could be found. Those states never occur, 
or are extremely rare, because of stabilizing intervention. This 
consideration also complicates the formulation of the antici-
patory behavior discussed above: Participants understand the 
stabilizing role of the central bank and may come to rely on 
it when forming their expectations—a point we consider later 
in this summary.
Large-Scale Simulation Models 
and Policy Decisions
Some of the discussion focused on what lessons might be 
learned from simulation models and how the integration of 
models of different scales might inform policy decisions. The 
models presented analyzed liquidity in terms of the liquidity 
properties of the network, such as the transition between 
congested and noncongested states, and in terms of the 
functioning of the marketplace for liquidity redistribution. 
These models allow for simulation of the network’s respon-
siveness to liquidity injections by the central bank. What is 
striking about them is their sensitivity to these injections. 
A useful endeavor, suggested during the discussion, would 
be to construct simulations that shed light on the amount 
of liquidity needed by the system in different types of stress 
scenarios. That is to say, how much liquidity should be 
provided in response to different physical disruptions to the 
network, and to which institutions should it be provided? 
9As an analogy, consider the electrical power distribution system: What if the 
government instantaneously opened a new power line that was not there before 
whenever a failure occurred in the grid?
For instance, while we tend to focus on the largest institutions—
perhaps on the assumption that they are the most connected—
a medium-size network participant might also be important 
because of the high degree of its connectedness in the network.
Another issue raised was whether the simulation models’ 
degree of resolution would be comparable to the type of 
information policymakers may actually have in a crisis. For 
example, is it practical to build simulation models with a high 
level of resolution? And at what level of policy can simulation 
exercises be feasibly aimed—at a high level to inform policy-
makers of trade-offs and general principles, or at a more 
granular level to emphasize specific steps to take in a crisis? 
With regard to these questions, conference participants 
would like to see closer integration between simulation models 
at different scales—between the small-scale behavior of 
individual decision makers and the large-scale aggregate 
behavior of the system. Accordingly, a hierarchy of models with 
different scales is needed. The general challenge here, common 
to multiscale modeling in most domains, is building realistic 
links between the small-scale behavior at the level of individual 
agents and the large-scale aggregate behavior of the system. 
A particular challenge in this application is likely to be the 
range of behaviors and expectations at the micro level of 
individual decision makers that can be feasibly modeled in 
simulations. Thus, to what degree can anticipatory behavior 
and expectations of economic agents be realistically 
represented in simulation models, especially in simulations 
of systemic crises that are not modeling “business as usual”? 
While the issue has both conceptual and empirical dimensions, 
the empirical basis for this behavioral component is apt to be 
limited because systemic crises occur so infrequently.
Behavioral and Mutable Aspects 
of Network Connections
John O’Brien of the Haas School of Business at Berkeley 
commented on the application of the web-and-node model to 
the events of 1987. As O’Brien explained it, the nodes represent 
the individual investment banks and brokers, and they were all 
under pressure to be more conservative. Therefore, each node 
was trying to eliminate its assets and reduce its leverage. The 
system overall would be harmed by that activity, however, 
because as each node protected itself it would put pressure on 
the others. At the system level, the Federal Reserve was trying 
to make credit more readily available, but that change could 
not be pushed down to the node level because the top priority 
of the brokers in the investment banks was to meet margin 
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calls and reduce their leverage. Since the situation in 1987 
seems to fit the web-and-node model, O’Brien observed, what 
does the model suggest about policy if a similar situation were 
to develop? Robert Litzenberger of Azimuth Trust explained 
that the answer depends on knowing whether the shock will 
dissipate or be self-reinforcing. Because many events will cause 
only a mild market decline, we need to learn what types of 
conditions will exacerbate problems. One relevant insight is 
that economists sometimes partition the market into informed 
traders and liquidity traders. If the shock is affecting mostly 
liquidity traders, policymakers might decide to act, Litzenberger 
said. However, if some of the selling is attributable to informed 
traders, policymakers might instead opt to refrain from taking 
action.
Douglas Gale of New York University added that in 1987, 
some investors could not get in on the other side of the market 
because dealers essentially would not answer their phones. 
This problem illustrates one of the important differences 
between contagion in a complex system that includes rigid 
links between nodes (such as the electric grid), where the 
collapse of a node has to be triggered by an event that hits it 
in a physical sense, and the banking system, where links are 
somewhat fluid depending on the perceptions and expectations 
of the nodes. When the links are choices made by people 
anticipating contagion, the links might start breaking before 
the contagion reaches them. Gale’s comment points to the 
central importance of human expectations and decisions in 
the operation of financial markets. Risk analysis of financial 
systems is more dependent on human behavior than is risk 
analysis of engineered systems.
Evolution of the Payments System
The session concluded with a discussion of whether the 
payments system could evolve into a less stable configuration. 
Participants considered constraints that could be placed on the 
evolution of the payments system to maintain its stability in the 
face of ongoing changes in the financial system. 
An important issue raised in this context was moral hazard. 
Whenever the central bank intervenes to mitigate or reduce the 
effects of a systemic shock, it can influence the future risk-
taking incentives of private sector decision makers by 
weakening the perceived need to plan for the occurrence of 
extreme shocks. This moral hazard issue can potentially 
influence the state of the system and its vulnerability to shocks 
through the risks taken by investors and financial institutions. 
For researchers, this issue could be a factor when choosing the 
behavioral features of their models. Consideration of such 
behavioral issues, more generally, can add to the richness 
of the results obtained from simulation models.
One notable issue that might be illuminated by the models 
is the current tendency of payments in the system to migrate 
toward the end of the day. This shift in payments timing would 
appear to raise the likelihood of a congested state, as system 
participants seem to hold back payments until late in the day. 
Conference discussants noted that the Federal Reserve is 
looking at how payments system policies affect use of the 
liquidity pool. For example, which policies might be inducing 
participants to shift their payments to later in the day, and 
which might reverse that practice so participants can use the 
available liquidity in the system more efficiently? Two changes 
that might have played a role in the shift in payments timing 
in recent years are the reduction in reserve balances, as banks 
make more efficient use of reserves, and a higher demand on 
the pool of liquidity attributable to increases in the volume 
of obligations to be settled.
Another issue raised was whether the financial system is 
moving toward increased homogeneity and greater 
connectivity. Greater connectivity seems to be self-evident, 
but in some ways we are actually seeing an increase in 
heterogeneity. A shift has occurred from a bank—oriented 
financial system to a securities-market–oriented system in 
which a more diverse population of financial institutions 
interact. The diversity of investors in today’s financial system—
such as pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, 
private equity and hedge funds, investment banks, and 
commercial banks—makes for a more heterogeneous set of 
financial system participants than in the traditional bank-
oriented models of the financial system. In this sense, the 
system has become more robust. That said, conference 
participants observed that a handful of very large financial 
firms play central roles in the financial system, and we need to 
look carefully at ways to increase the robustness of the systems 
and utilities that tie these firms together.
Risk analysis of financial systems is more 
dependent on human behavior than is risk 
analysis of engineered systems. References
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